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A New Approach to Risk Coverage in
the Motion Picture Industry:
Short-Term Life Insurance
By HEINZ J. PULVERMAN* and ALAN J. SETLIN**

The role of insurance in facilitating business finance by protecting
capital risks is well recognized:
"Insurance tends to increase the supply of investable capital
through creation, of reserves for losses, both present and future.
This tends to create a more favorable investment climate and reduces the drain on government resources. Through insurance,
credit is expanded by reducing the subjective risk experienced by
lenders. Insurance contributes to the incentives to preserve and
improve property through loss-prevention effort."'
In the motion picture industry especially, the sizeable investment
now required for a major production (and some not so major ones)
would not be forthcoming as easily, or at all, if capital had to assume all the risks inherent in production. The nature of the risks
inherent in motion picture production is quite unique to the industry. Compare, for example, the production of electrical power.
The generation of electricity from water resources might require a
greater number of dollars invested in turbines, but it is possible to
own a spare turbine, or at least spare parts for one, and any defective piece of machinery can be repaired or replaced. Such replacement or repair may not be possible in the production of a motion
picture. If a motion picture is three-quarters "in the can" when the
heroine falls from a horse and breaks her ankle and suffers facial
abrasions, and there are close-ups still to be shot, there is nothing
to do but wait for her to recover. She is not replaceable and there
* HEINZ J.PULVERMAN, C.L.U., is currently General Agent for Maccabees Mutual
Life Insurance Company in Santa Monica. He also teaches insurance courses at Los Angeles
Valley College. In the past, he has served as president of the Western Los Angeles Life
Underwriters Association and as vice chairman of education for the National Association of
Life Underwriters.
** ALAN J.SETLIN, C.L.U., is president of Alliance Associates, Inc., Beverly Hills, a firm
serving as general agent for Beneficial National Life Insurance Company. He specializes in
pension and profit-sharing plans as well as special risk life insurance. He has also served a
term as president of the Western Los Angeles Life Underwriters Association and is currently
president-elect of the Los Angeles County Chapter of Chartered Life Underwriters.

1. M. GREEN, RISK AND INSURANCE, 637 (4th ed. 1976).
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are no spare parts. The rest of the cast must sit around and wait,
and so must the equipment, rented at thousands of dollars per day.
If the star's recovery is likely to be time-consuming, it may be
possible to "write her out" of the rest of the picture. But since
episodes are rarely filmed in sequence, eliminating her may not be
possible. In any case, even attempting to do so requires skilled writers, consent of the author, and probably the author's willing cooperation. It requires time, the equivalent of money. And the loss to the
story continuity may be such that hopes for box-office success may
be irretrievably damaged.

Cast Insurance
Almost since the beginning of motion picture production, such
possibilities have been insured against through cast insurance. Basically, this is a special contract for casualty insurance, covering such
actual expenses as leased equipment, props, and salaries and wages
for actors and other members of a production crew while they wait
for the star to recover. Cast insurance indemnifies for thousands of
other losses actually incurred during such an unexpected emergency. Without cast insurance, the risk in movie-making would be
such that few investors could be expected to commit large sums of
money to an already speculative business venture.
These actual losses are to be distinguished from a variety of potential losses which are not covered by cast insurance. For example,
guarantees promised to the star by contract, such as a percentage
of the box-office sales, is a speculative figure and not a loss actually
incurred. Other potential losses to the star might include advances'
or payments to surviving families in the event of a star's death.' Still
other potential losses to the production might include interest payments on loans or invested capital, loss of invested funds, or loss of
anticipated profits. In the example above, where an injury or even
death to the star results in a delay or discontinuance of the production, these potential losses would not have been actually paid and
therefore would not be covered by cast insurance.
These production risks can be covered by a life insurance policy
because such a policy can be taken out at an amount calculated high
enough to cover the risk of these potential losses. But the traditional
2. An advance is not money actually paid because, in theory, it is due later.
3. These matters are usually the subject of individual negotiations, are not covered by cast
insurance and usually differ from one performer to another.
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procedures for issuing a life insurance policy are unsuited for the
issuance of life insurance for the relatively short period it is required
during the production time of a film. This commentary will describe
the special problems underlying the creation of a short-term life
insurance policy and the manner in which these problems were resolved.'

Traditional Life Insurance Underwriting
The traditional process for the approval of a life insurance application is so extensive and complex that it frustrates the effective
implementation of a short-term policy. Life insurance is purchased
like any other contract except that the purchaser' of life insurance
must satisfy a unique set of conditions before the seller will agree
to provide life insurance: the buyer must demonstrate to the seller
that the insured's state of health is satisfactory under the terms of
4. There was and still is the possibility of getting insurance from Lloyds of London. But
life insurance is one of the types of coverage specifically excluded from consideration by the
underwriters at Lloyds and the issuance of a policy would be more in the nature of accident
insurance or very-short-term life insurance (e.g., one or two days). It would therefore be
lacking in full coverage in that any death other than a clearly accidental one (for example, a
heart attack) would not produce the required benefit.
5. The legal owner of the policy, the applicant, is the party having an insurable interest,
i.e., whoever stands to suffer financial loss if the insured dies. Everyone, of course, has an
insurable interest in his or her own life, (CAL. INS. CODE § 10110 (West 1972)) and by extensiop, so has one's spouse. But they may not be the ones who would suffer all the financial
loss; more likely, it would be the production company and its shareholders, the investors.
Whenever insurable interest rests in someone other than the insured or his immediate
family insurance companies look to the applicant for proof that he, indeed, possesses the
interest. If that applicant is a corporation, proof must be accompanied by detailed financial
statements and written explanations.
It is important to note that the designation of beneficiaries has significant tax implications.
As a general rule, when the applicant for insurance is not related to the insured, the applicantowner should also be the beneficiary. Otherwise, there is a real danger that the owner would
be considered to have made a taxable gift of the proceeds of the policy if it becomes payable
due to the insured's death. Goodman v. Comm'r,.156 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1946); Rev. Rul. 73207, 1973-1 C.B. 409.
Insurance proceeds are generally not subject to income taxes. I.R.C. § 101(a)(1); United
States v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U.S. 189 (1923). Nor is the gain (proceeds over
paid premiums) taxable. However, if the insured had any incidents of ownership, even to the
extent of owning a majority of the shares of the corporation owning the policy, the proceeds
would be taxable to his or her estate. I.R.C. § 2042(2); Kearns v. United States, 399 F.2d 226
(Ct. Cl. 1968); Cockrill v. O'Hara, 302 F. Supp. 1365 (M.D. Tenn. 1969). In view of this
hazard, and the not infrequent occurrence when a star owns a percentage of the production,
one must carefully consider whose loss is to be insured, and then tailor the arrangements in
such manner that the party becomes the owner/applicant for the policy, as well as the
beneficiary. Since the owner/applicant is also the premium-payer, and the premium for the
face amounts of insurance involved may run into five or six figures, such arrangements must
include provisions for the funding of the necessary premium dollars.
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the agreement. Also, it is not unusual for more than one seller to be
involved in the transaction, because the amount of coverage may
exceed one seller's capacity for risk retention.
In the normal course of business, an insurance application is com pleted. The proposed insured submits to one or more physical examinations of various degrees of complexity, depending on the age and
amount of coverage required. Often these may include chest x-rays,
electrocardiograms with or without stress exercises, pulse measurements, blood studies, urinalyses, and occasionally, if the health
history so indicates, even more protracted laboratory tests; a questionnaire is completed to elicit medical history, and reports from
previous attending physicians are obtained, not infrequently going
back for more than ten years.
In the meantime, facts concerning both the insured's and the
applicant's financial standing are ascertained through inspections
of properties, underlying financial statements and interviews with
individuals in a position to confirm them. Such interviews may raise
additional questions to be asked of the insured and/or applicant.
Past income tax records may be requested and examined. Depending upon the cooperation received from all parties concerned, all
these procedures may take a considerable length of time. One to two
months is not unusual, four months or more is still realistic.
Once a file has been completed and a recommendation formulated by the underwriters, it is submitted to an underwriting committee which may accept the application, reject it, or modify it by
assigning extra charges for what may be considered extra hazards
based on the proposed insured's health history, his or her habits,
associates, business interests or occupation.
If the amount applied for exceeds the company's risk retention
limit, the file and recommendations are submitted to reinsurers who
may seek answers to additional questions. By this time the paperwork, if piled in one stack, may exceed the height of the company's
home office building, and the direct expenses in the doctors' and
inspection fees may amount to a considerable sum.
If reinsurers' agree with the primary company's findings and
agree to accept a portion of the risk, and if full participation has
been obtained, the primary company will then issue a policy for the
full required amount in its own name and forward it to the writing
6. Reinsurance lays back the risk on another insurer but does not concern the insured and
is usually not communicated to him.
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agent or broker for delivery. Any changes in the original offer must
be acknowledged by the owner/applicant's signature and the initial
premium must be paid. Only then does the coverage attach.'

Unsuitability of Traditional Underwriting for ShortTerm Life Insurance
In the motion picture industry, it is not uncommon for the need
for the life insurance coverage to have expired by the time the coverage attaches. It is also not uncommon for the principals never to
have properly understood that coverage was not bound as of the
time the application was signed, and it is very fortunate that no
sizeable claim of this kind has occurred so far to shake public confidence in the institution of life insurance. But if everything proceeded according to plan, the life insurance is issued as applied for
and put in effect by payment of the first premium. At the end of
three to six months, there may no longer be a need for insurance
because by that time the picture may be completed, perhaps already released, and profits no longer dependent upon the star's
survival.
If after the picture is completed the policy is still in effect, a
rather anomalous situation is created. Our insured now lives his or
her life with perhaps several million dollars of insurance being
owned by someone who no longer has an insurable interest, or stands
to-suffer a financial loss, if the insured were to die. The California
Insurance Code requires only that an insurable interest must exist
at policy issue," not at the time of claim. No one can force the owner
of the policy to lapse it by discontinuing payments, and if he chooses
not to do so, our star is in the unenviable position of living with a
7. There is a fundaimental difference between cast insurance and life insurance with respect
to the timing of the premium payments. Cast insurance is basically casualty coverage which
can be bound, i.e., insurance placed in effect whenever a firm order for it is transmitted.
Premiums are then billed by the agent or broker, and timing of payment of the premium is
often a matter of negotiation. CAL. INS. CODE § § 381-82 (West 1972). For exceptions, see 10
CAL. ADMIN. CODE § § 2271-2274.5 (1971).
Life insurance, on the other hand, becomes effective only when the first premium is paid.
CAL. INS. CODE § 10115 (West 1972). It is customary to accept a premium when the application
is signed. Coverage in this case becomes effective as soon as the medical examination is
completed and the insurance company has approved the application. But with the large face
amounts usually involved in motion picture insurance, companies specifically restrict the
agent's or broker's authority to accept a premium, and coverage therefore cannot be bound,
nor placed in effect, until the application is approved and the premium paid while the
proposed insured is in the same state of health as he was when he was medically examined.
CAL. INS. CODE § 10115 (West 1972).
8. CAL. INS. CODE § 286 (West 1972).

92

CoMm/ENT

[Vol. 2

sizeable prize on his head. Although it is unlikely to happen, it
could. Consequently, counsel should advise their clients to provide
in the employment contract that once the original beneficiary's interest' expires, the contract be offered to the insured for purchase
(a valuable privilege if the star has suffered a disability in the meantime and perhaps has become uninsurable) or that it be discontinued.
But there is another problem. Life insurance traditionally is
priced in such a way that the first year's premium covers only a
portion of the seller's cost, and in fact, costs are not totally recovered
for a number of years (often from four to seven). Profits are made
only after such recovery has been made. Consequently, if a company
has any suspicion that the policy is likely to lapse early, it would
most likely decline to issue the policy.
Companies are rated by industry rating services by the amounts
of insurance written per year. Agents achieve awards and status
(such as membership in the Million Dollar Round Table) by writing
the required volume of insurance per year, with an additional persistency requirement. Writing a one million dollar policy that lapses
during the first year does not relegate agent and company to point
zero but to zero minus one million because lapses are rated and
published separately. In other words, sales would read at zero, and
lapses at minus one million. An additional one million dollars of
other insurance would have to be written before records would be
where they started.
Therefore, neither agent nor company would be particularly anxious to assist in procuring such short-term coverage. If an agent who
earns commissions even on premiums paid only for a portion of a
year chose to forgo status in favor of commissions, he might find it
difficult to repeat his performance in an industry that is more
closely knit than most people imagine, where reputations are
quickly established, but rarely lived down. Most companies would
therefore turn down applications from agents known to have caused
excessive lapsation, and the agent would in effect run out of markets
in which to place future insurance.

Short-Term Life Insurance
In regard to the need for a short term life insurance policy, insurance companies have expressed three major concerns:"'
9. See note 5 supra.
10. In the fall of 1976, one of the authors informally contacted a number of insurance
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1) Would there be a large enough demand to warrant the expenditure involved in creating a new policy? New policies have to
be filed and receive approval from the insurance commissioners 'of
all fifty states, or at least those in which the company is licensed to
do business. Filing is a complicated and expensive process, involving extensive paperwork and frequent appearances at hearings or
other quasi-judicial proceedings.
2) Since the face amounts of insurance would likely run into
figures well above the average, would the company be able to procure reliable reinsurance agreements over and above the amount of
risk per individual life it was prepared to retain?
3) Would it be possible to short-cut the underwriting process so
that policies would be issued in a much shorter period of time and
without so much of the cumbersome proof ordinarily required for
large amounts of life insurance?
Almost without exception, life insurance policies are issued for
long periods of time, or, if more limited, are guaranteed to be renewable without proof of insurability. The insurance company is therefore justified in wanting to know whether the proposed insured's
current state of health and past medical history are such that conformity with established mortality tables can be expected. At the
proposed insured's age, the statistical tables predict a certain number of years of life expectancy for applicants judged to be of standard health. Any impairment in health can be assigned statistical
demerits translatable into reduced life expectancy. Because the
same amount of money must be collected in order to pay the death
benefit, but in a shorter period of time, periodic premium payments
must be higher.
In a policy issued for a much shorter period of time, for example,
companies to develop a short-term life insurance policy. The immediate impetus was provided by an application for $7.7 million on the life of a well-known entertainer which required
over four and one-half months to issue.
Of the insurance companies contacted, the authors received an encouraging reply from
Beneficial National Life Insurance Company of New York. Their vice president and chief
actuary, Mr. Saul Rosenthal, summarized our arguments in a memorandum to Mr. Frank
Crohn, president of the company as follows:
"Maybe life insurance companies should not write this type of key man short-term
coverage at all-but if they should, the present method of doing it is all wrong. It
is too expensive. Much of the underwriting activity is, as Mr. Pulverman points out,
pointless. The underwriting procedure is self-defeating because it often takes so
long that the policy cannot be issued when it is needed. But worst of all, if we do
issue a policy, it is certain to be unprofitable because of the combination of high
expenses, short duration, and low premium."
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for only six months, it really was not important for the company to
know that the proposed insured could reasonably be expected to live
the statistically expected number of years. The company was entitled to know whether the insured's state of health was such as to
expect him to live more than six months. In most cases, that can
be done with a simple medical history questionnaire and examination, without sophisticated laboratory tests and statements from
physicians who have attended the applicant in the past.
Similarly, it should be sufficient to ascertain that the insured is
indeed engaged in an endeavor giving rise to short-term financial
risk - his or her past financial statements, or those of their corporations, are important for appraisal of lifetime risks, but bear little
relationship to short-term judgments.
Five basic requirements for the development of the short-term life
insurance policy were proposed by Beneficial National Life Insurance Company of New York:
1) a judgment as to how much conventional underwriting technicalities could safely be eliminated so that policies could be issued
within five working days;
2) a judgment as to the level at which to set premiums so that

they would be fairly economical while still producing enough income to cover expenses and mortality risk;
3) an acceptance by the agent of a substantially lower commission than conventional first year commission rates, in view of the
fact that normal long-time service requirements are non-existent;
4) a requirement that applications must be prepaid, with issuance by the agent of a conditional receipt binding coverage as soon
as the medical examination has been completed;"
5) an attempt to operate the program with only one knowledgeable and flexible reinsurer with substantial capacity."
The company soon decided that the required coverage could be
offered within the framework of existing term policies, eliminating
the need for costly and time-consuming filing of a new product with
the various state insurance departments. The real breakthrough was
11. The problem of binding coverage for large amounts of insurance appeared very dramatic at first, in that most companies limit the privilege of issuing a binder to experienced
agents only, whose field underwriting practices are known, and then only to amounts generally less than $200,000. However, Mr. Rosenthal pointed out that the problem would be
minimized within a framework where the company would either issue a policy inside of five
days, or return the advance premium to "get off the risk."
12. Subsequent to this memorandum, some of the specifics of the program were changed,
but the general concepts remained the same.
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in the underwriting approach, rather than in the creation of a new
product.
In June of 1977, Beneficial National announced the availability
of what the company called STAR TERM, a nonconvertible and
non-renewable policy issued through age 65 for periods of from 3 to
12 months, in amounts up to $5,000,000 per applicant. The prompt
response feature of the original working papers was retained. The
company indicated that it would normally expect to issue a policy
within five working days. However, the agent did not have the immediate authority to bind the company to the risk. The company
would inform the agent within five days from receipt of all the
necessary information of the underwriting action, and if positive,
that the premium could be collected. In essence, then, coverage
could be bound on acceptable risks within five days."
What information is needed to meet the underwriting requirements? The company wants a signed application, a medical examination with the usual requirements for the age of the applicant and amount of insurance, an inspection report," and a "key
report" from the applicant or agent. Presumably a key report must
contain information on the nature of the project giving rise to the
need for insurance, the proposed insured's and applicant's connection with it, financial details and names and addresses of people in
a position to corroborate such information independently. Since it
is unlikely that such corroboration can be obtained within five days,
it would appear that the company wants the information mainly to
form a total picture of the proposed insured for its underwriting
decision and, of course, to have on hand as complete a file as possible in case something goes wrong.
The problems inherent in the short-term life insurance policy
have been resolved and such protection is now available for motion
picture production. The policy has gone beyond its initially intended show business application and the contract is designed for
any situation in which the survival of a major business project de13. Another company, United States Life of California, is said to have brought out a
somewhat similar policy, but without the innovative (and necessary) underwriting changes
instituted by Beneficial National. For example, U.S. Life has not indicated that it will tailor
underwriting requirements to the specific needs of the film industry, nor that it stands ready
to approve applications within five days.
14. These are third-party interviews and inspections of addresses furnished by the applicant, usually required for applications for $25,000 or more and performed by companies like
Equifax or Hooper-Holmes.
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pends on the life of one person or those of a very few people. In
addition to movie stars, engineers during the crucial stages of a
design or construction project, or business people during a merger
or other important transitional periods may be covered by a shortterm life insurance policy.

"Can We Save Our Ball Club?":
The Availability of Injunctive Relief for a
Municipality to Prevent the Threatened Breach of a
Stadium Lease Agreement by a Professional Sports
Franchise
By WILLIAM L.

BABCOCK,* MARK

A.

STEINER,** AND PATRICK BALDWIN**

Introduction
As the national interest in professional sport increases, new professional sports leagues are born and established leagues continue
to expand. Major metropolitan areas compete openly and feverishly
for an opportunity to house a professional sport franchise. In that
connection, a city will often provide a stadium, constructed through
public funding, and enter into a long-term lease agreement with the
franchise in order to recapture a portion of the invested costs of
construction. Apart from the economic concerns, however, longterm lease arrangements insure that the additional benefits of an
established professional sports franchise will accrue to the municipality and its citizenry.' These benefits include the availability of
unique entertainment, an increased sense of civic pride, and added
publicity and prestige that spawns expanded commercial activity
and tourism within the particular area. Furthermore, in order to
encourage a team to reside in that city, the lease agreement will
often include reduced rental payments, as well as substantial subsidies in the form of tax advantages.2
Thus, under ideal conditions, the team and the municipality derive mutual economic benefits from a properly drawn long-term
lease agreement. Unfortunately, several recent instances have arisen wherein the team has considered its position less than ideal and
consequently has attempted to relocate in another city before the
term of the lease has expired. In an effort to salvage the advantages
relevant to a sports franchise's presence, counsel for the municipal* Member, second year class. ** Member, third year class.
1. Note, The Professional Athlete and the First Amendment: A Question of Judicial
Intervention, 4 HorsTRA L. REv. 417, 426-32 (1976).
2. Okner, Subsidies of Stadiums and Arenas, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESs 325

(R. Noll ed. 1974).
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ity has traditionally sought injunctive and equitable relief to prevent the team's departure. This note will examine the inconsistent
results of such litigation, as well as attempt to provide a more successful formula for the municipality to preclude the irreparable
losses engendered by the untimely flight of the home team.
In addition to the legal relationship that is created between the
municipality and the franchise via the terms of the lease, the unique
emotional relationship that develops between the team and the avid
sports fan should be recognized. It is this additional relationship
that appears most offended by a legal result that allows the team
to relocate. A New York court, faced with the decision of whether
to approve the departure of the then-New York Giants baseball club
to San Francisco, perhaps best articulated this emotional-legal dichotomy:
This case has, in truth, been a most difficult one for the court
to resolve, for beneath these judicial robes beats the heart of a
Giant fan. As the spring breezes bring closer 'Opening Day' of the
Great American Pastime, nostalgic memories spring sharply into
focus-from the far past the unsurpassed exploits of 'Iron Man'
McGinnity, Roger Bresnahan, Christy Mathewson, 'Chief Meyers,
and Rogers Hornsby, and closer to our own times, the glory of ten
pennants under the great John McGraw, the inimitable 'screwball'
of Carl Hubbell, affable Mel Ott, that less than speedy Ernie Lombardi, the irrepressible Willie Mays, and the drama of Bobby
Thomson's winning home run in the 1951 playoff against the
'Bums' to carry on the tradition. A wave of regret wells up at the
thought that the Polo Grounds will cease to be the repository of
these memories, the only tangible remains of glorious yesterdays,
and that no more will the Clarion call 'Play Ball' echo from Coogan's Bluff . . . .

The Court readily admits that its sympathies lie wholly with
that 'dyed-in-the-wool Giant fan' who is the plaintiff herein and
fully understands the emotional upset experienced by him. And so
it is with heaviness of heart that the Court, as distinguished from
the fan, must find that plaintiffs contentions, while sentimentally
'four baggers,' are legally 'outs.' 3
It is hoped that this note will provide both the method and the
insight necessary to reconcile the emotional with the legal result,
such that the municipality and its citizenry may successfully prevent the threatened loss of a professional sports franchise. More
precisely, the only contractual remedy available which will ade3. November v. Nat'I Exhib. Co., 173 N.Y.S.2d 490, 492-93, 10 Misc. 2d 537 (1958).
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quately protect the municipality from this loss is specific performance of the lease agreement. The availability of injunctive relief as
the means of accomplishing specific performance is studied in a
five-part analysis. Part I reviews the current status of pertinent
statutory and case law in California, a jurisdiction where most of the
recent precedential litigation in this area has arisen and where the
statutory scheme severely disfavors the use of injunctive relief. Part
II explores the issue of whether monetary damages at law, if ascertainable, can adequately compensate a municipality for the loss of
a major league team, thereby making injunctive relief unnecessary
and inappropriate. Part III evaluates the current status of the law
within the area of stipulated remedies, in an effort to measure the
viability of such a provision were it included in the standard lease
agreement. Part IV examines, apart from a strict legal analysis, the
practical objections to injunctive relief, where such remedy ignores
the economic realities of an unsuccessful franchise and arguably
forces the team into bankruptcy. Part V includes a representative
sampling of stadium leases between municipally owned stadiums
and privately owned professional sports franchises. In noting the
various types of lease provisions and the legal consequences that
may arise in respect thereof, advice to the draftsman is provided as
to the appropriate form of the lease necessary to prohibit the unanticipated departure of a franchise. In support of the proposed advice,
Part V will analyze the results of recent litigation in this area, concentrating particularly on the distinctions evident in the language
of the various lease provisions.
Assuming that professional sports will continue to expand to meet
the needs of an entranced public and that cities will continue to
actively solicit and promote the presence of various athletic franchises in their communities, the prospect of increased litigation in
this novel area of the law appears inescapable. A disgruntled franchise, faced with reduced financial success as a result of what it
views to be local non-support, and enticed by more favorable offers
from competing municipalities, will inevitably seek to buy its way
out of long-term lease obligations. If these efforts are judicially sanctioned, a city will be left with an empty, heavily financed stadium,
and with little hope of attracting a substitute team, for the very
reasons that impelled the first franchise to exit.
Finally, it is hoped that this note will in some measure sensitize
the courts to the issues present in this enigmatic area of the law. In
so doing, a more consistent and equitable judicial response to the
problem of an aggrieved municipality can be developed, such that
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counsel, through proper drafting of the lease agreement, will be able
to effectively enjoin the large-scale flight of a locally subsidized
professional sports franchise.

PART I
PERTINENT CALIFORNIA STATUTES AND CASES
As initially discussed, the general lease agreement between the
municipality and the professional sports franchise, under ideal conditions, will prove mutually satisfactory. The city will gain added
prestige and increased commercially related revenues, as well as
emotional identity with the home team, while the franchise will be
subsidized through reduced rental payments and significant tax
advantages. The typical problem arises, however, when the team
fails to perform in the championship manner anticipated, if not
required, by the unforgiving American sports fan. As a result, attendance declines and the franchise suffers decreased profits. Rather
than expend additional monies in order to strengthen the caliber of
its players or to attract fans through various promotional gambits,
management may simply prefer to relocate. Given the substantial
likelihood that several cities would be eager for the services and
glamour of a professional team, the franchise announces its intention to move to a more supportive (and profitable) location.' Treating this as an unequivocal anticipatory repudiation of the lease, the
municipality applies for a preliminary injunction to restrain the
team from performing for another, and further seeks specific performance by the franchise for the term of the lease obligation. Predictably, the team expresses its willingness to compensate the city
for the breach of the agreement and objects to the imposition of
injunctive relief (i.e., specific performance) where an adequate and
ascertainable remedy at law exists (i.e., money damages). Hence,
of major concern to the municipality and the sports franchise are
the legal principles surrounding (1) the granting or withholding of
preliminary injunctions and (2) the adequacy and ascertainability
of damages.

Ground8 for a Preliminary Injunction
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status
quo ante litem pending a determination of the controversy on the
4. The incident of relocation may occur either through outright sale of the franchise to new
ownership or simple transfer by the present owners to another city. This is irrelevant to the
discussion herein, since in either event the threatened loss of the franchise would be complete.
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merits.' To justify issuance, it is ordinarily sufficient that the plaintiff raise serious and substantial questions going to the merits so as
to indicate a fair ground for litigation and more deliberate investigation.' In sum, the granting of a preliminary injunction represents the
court's equitable conclusion that, pending a trial on the merits, the
defendant should be restrained from exercising his claimed rights.
Section 526 of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates several
independent grounds upon which a California court may properly
grant an injunction:
(1) [when] it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded;
(2) when the commission or continuance of some act during the
litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury, to a
party to the action;
(3) when during the litigation, a party to the action is doing, or
threatens, or is about to do, some act in violation of the rights of
another party to the action, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual;
(4) when pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief;
(5) where it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount

of compensation which would afford adequate relief.'
It would appear that the threatened departure of a professional
sports franchise is an event embraced by one, if not several, of the
above-mentioned grounds, thereby warranting the issuance of a preliminary injunction. At the very least, the completed act of relocation would tend to render any judgment in favor of the municipality
ineffectual. Furthermore, the loss occasioned by the franchise's departure would cause some injury to the municipality, in the form of
lost revenues and a heavily financed empty stadium, unless a replacement franchise is in the immediate offing-an unlikely event.
Whether such injury is irreparable, and whether pecuniary compensation would be both adequate and ascertainable, are issues to be
discussed.!
5. Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 304 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Cal.), affd
419 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1969); Continental Baking Co. v. Katz, 68 Cal. 2d 512, 67 Cal. Rptr.
761, 439 P.2d 889 (1968); Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc., 316 F.2d 804, 808-09 (9th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied 375 U.S. 821 (1963); Wind v. Herbert, 186 Cal. App. 2d 276, 8 Cal.
Rptr. 817 (1960); Dennis v. Overholtzer, 149 Cal. App. 2d 101, 104, 307 P.2d 1012, 1014 (1957);
Gray v. Bybee, 60 Cal. App. 2d 564, 141 P.2d 32 (1943).
6. Socialist Workers 1974 Calif. Campaign Comm. v. Brown, 53 Cal. App. 3d 879, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 915 (1975); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1953).
7. CAL. CODE CIv. Paoc. § 526 (West 1973).
8. See Part II, infra.
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First, however, the obstacle presented by section 3423 of the California Civil Code must be hurdled: "an injunction cannot be
granted to prevent the breach of contract . . . the performance of
which would not be specifically enforced . . . ."' This statutory

exemption has been uniformly interpreted by California courts to
mean that where a contract contains both affirmative and negative
covenants, as does the standard stadium lease agreement,'" equity
will not enjoin the breach of the negative covenants (i.e., not to
perform elsewhere) where the affirmative covenants (i.e., to pay
rent) cannot be specifically enforced by judicial decree." Obviously,
if the municipality fails to overcome this statutory exception, the
motion for a preliminary injunction will be denied and/or deemed
in excess of jurisdiction." Therefore, the propriety of injunctive relief first depends upon the crucial issue of whether the California
courts can, or will, specifically enforce the lease agreement.

Does California Law Bar the Award of Injunctive Relief?
In this regard, California courts have historically refused to decree
specific performance of a contract whose terms demand a succession
of continuous acts requiring protracted judicial supervision.,' This
rule of equity-the "continuous acts" doctrine-was first adopted
by the California Supreme Court in Long Beach Drug Co. v. United
Drug Co.'4 There, injunctive relief was denied on the ground that,
because specific performance of the affirmative covenants in the
exclusive agency agreement at issue (i.e., defendant covenanted to
sell goods only to plaintiff) would require protracted judicial supervision, the Court would not interfere to enjoin the breach of the
negative covenants (i.e., not to sell to others). More recently, in
Thayer Plymouth Center, Inc. v. ChryslerMotors Corp., ' the Court
again refused to grant injunctive relief and held that the contract,
in this instance an exclusive automobile dealership, could not be
9. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3423 (West 1973).
10. See Part V and accompanying lease provisions, infra.
11. Thayer Plymouth Center, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 255 Cal. App. 2d 300, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 148 (1967); Long Beach Drug Co. v. United Drug Co., 13 Cal. 2d 158, 88 P.2d 698 (1939);
Anderson v. Neal Insts. Co., 37 Cal. App. 174, 173 P. 779 (1918).
12. Agricultural Labor Rel. Bd. v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 392, 401, 128 Cal. Rptr. 183,
546 P.2d 687 (1976); City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 423, 430, 333 P.2d 745,
748 (1959); Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. 672, 681, 154 P. 845, 849 (1916).
13. Nadell & Co. v. Grasso, 175 Cal. App. 2d 420, 346 P.2d 505 (1959); Poultry Producers
v. Barlow, 189 Cal. 278; 208 P. 93 (1922); Pacific Electric Ry. Co. v. Campbell-Johnston, 153
Cal. 106, 94 P. 623 (1908).
14. 13 Cal. 2d 158, 89 P.2d 386 (1939).
15. 255 Cal. App. 2d 300, 63 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1967).
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specifically enforced since it involved supervision of several acts
over an extended length of time. Similarly, the Court has deemed
injunctive relief inappropriate where the contract contemplated
close cooperation between the parties." Furthermore, the Court has
dealt directly with the problem of specific performance of an ongoing, long-term property lease and cited the "continuous acts" doctrine as controlling. 7
If a typical franchise/municipality stadium lease agreement were
deemed judicially indistinguishable from other long-term leases
containing affirmative and negative covenants, then clearly the
"continuous acts" doctrine would apply. Admittedly, the lease contemplates a succession of acts over an extended period of time, as
well as requiring close cooperation between the municipality and
the sports franchise. Nevertheless, two relevant common law limitations to section 3423 of the California Civil Code have developed
which should protect the stadium lease from wholesale consumption
by the "continuous acts" doctrine.
Case law supports the contention that section 3423 of the Civil
Code should not be strictly construed so as to bar, at all times,
issuance of a preliminary injunction to prevent breach of a specifically unenforceable contract. In Morris v. Iden, 11plaintiff's assignor
and defendant entered into a lease agreement wherein plaintiff
promised to manage certain dairy property on the leased premises
in exchange for one-third of the income therefrom. When defendant
threatened to auction the dairy property, plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction restraining disposition of the property in his possession and further alleged that were the auction executed, no adequate remedy at law existed. In response to the defense that section
3423 of the California Civil Code would prevent the issuance of
injunctive relief, the court stated:
Obviously, the plaintiff was without a complete and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, for it would be impossible,
under the circumstances, to estimate, except by pure conjecture,
the damage he would suffer if the trespass threatened by defendants was consummated. Upon this ground he is entitled to the
protection of the injunctive jurisdiction of a court of equity, notwithstanding the want of that mutuality in the contract necessary
to authorize the specific enforcement of its terms. In Gallagherv.
16. Poultry Producers v. Barlow, supra note 13.
17. Whipple Rd. Quarry Co. v. L.C. Smith Co., 114 Cal. App. 2d 214, 249 P.2d 854 (1952).
18. Morris v. Iden, 23 Cal. App. 388, 138 P. 120 (1931).
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EquitableGas Light Co., 141 Cal. 699, 75 P. 329, and in other cases
therein cited, the right to an injunction in a certain class of cases
to prevent the violation of contracts which cannot be specifically
enforced is distinctly recognized and put upon the ground of a want
of an adequate remedy at law."

Thus, although a stadium lease may be construed as initially
consistent with other contracts declared specifically unenforceable
by reason of the continuous acts doctrine, injunctive relief may yet
obtain where no adequate remedy at law exists. If a municipality
can successfully argue that damages provide inadequate compensation for loss of a professional sports franchise,2 0 the prospect of equitable intervention is greatly enhanced."
Furthermore, no California case discusses the viability of section
3423 of the Civil Code when a significant public interest lies in the
balance. Although the term "public interest" is admittedly amorphous, several factors unique to a stadium lease arrangement should
serve convincingly to bring such contracts within its broad scope."
First, a recent survey has estimated that sports franchises are subsidized by local governments to the extent of approximately twentythree million dollars per year in the form of reduced rents and tax
advantages.23 Such extensive financial assistance assures long-term
interest and commitment on the part of the municipality. Furthermore, the financing for the stadium is generally accomplished
through extended public bonding, thereby securing the interest of
the local purchasing public in a stable franchise. The potential
harm to both the municipality and the citizenry as a result of a
contemplated breach of the lease agreement by the franchise should
be sufficiently "public" so as to justify an exception to the rigorous
application of the "continuous acts" doctrine. A New York court
19. Id. at 396; 138 P. at 123 (emphasis added).
20. See Part II, infra.
21. Other courts have in the past specifically enforced contracts requiring "continuous
acts" and extraordinary skills. Shubert Theatrical Co. v. Rath, 271 F. 827 (2d Cir. 1921)
(injunction to prevent breach of employment contract by actor); Dallas Cowboys v. Harris,
348 S.W.2d 37 (1961) (injunction to restrain defendant from playing football for anyone
except plaintiff); Central New York Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 19 Ohio 2d 130, 181 N.E.2d
506 (1961) (professional basketball club entitled to injunction to prevent player from playing
basketball for another club in another league).
22. Railroads have generally been construed as imbued with a public interest, such that
specific performance of "continuous" contracts has been deemed proper. Schmidt v. Louisville R.R., 101 Ky. 441, 41 S.W. 1015 (1897) (contract for 30 years specifically enforced);
Prospect Park & C.I. R.R. v. Coney Island & B.R.R., 144 N.Y. 152, 39 N.E. 17 (1894) (contract
for 21 years specifically enforced).
23. Okner, supra note 1, at 345.
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specifically recognized that a different approach may be warranted
where a public interest stands to be affected:
An exception to this rule [is] founded upon the rights of the
public rather than those of the plaintiff . . . [Wihen the inconve-

nience of the courts in acting is more than counterbalanced by the
inconvenience of the public if they do not act, the interest of the
public will prevail.24
Additional factors underscore the contention that the threatened
breach of a stadium lease agreement by the franchise will affect the
public interest, in that the citizenry will be denied the opportunity
to witness a major league sport and the municipality itself will suffer
loss of prestige and related revenues.2 5 Consequently, it is reasonable
to conclude that strict adherence to the "continuous acts" doctrine
may be less warranted where the breach of a stadium lease is concerned, given the public involvement.
In sum, an overly restrictive interpretation of section 3423 of the
California Civil Code may disable the court from providing relief
where a dominant public interest is in jeopardy and where no adequate remedy at law exists. The greater the inadequacy of other
remedies and the more a public expectation and interest stands to
be affected, the more willing courts should be to proceed with injunctive relief, despite administrative problems of enforcement.'" If
the "continuous acts" doctrine can be sufficiently overcome, then
the availability of injunctive relief will turn upon the critical issues
of whether damages at law for the breach of the stadium lease are
deemed adequate and ascertainable.

PART II
ADEQUACY AND ASCERTAINABILITY OF LEGAL
DAMAGES
As noted in Part I, the availability of injunctive relief to an aggrieved municipality will depend upon whether there exists an adequate remedy at law. If the legal remedy of compensatory damages
is sufficient to do justice between the parties, equity will not assume
24. Standard Fashion Co. v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 157 N.Y. 60, 51 N.E. 408 (1898).
25. See Part II, infra.
26. As stated by Justice Holmes in Jones v. Parker, 163 Mass. 564, 40 N.E. 1044 (1895):
"There is no universal rule that courts of equity never will enforce a contract which requires
some building to be done. They have enforced such contracts from the earliest days to present
time."
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jurisdiction.27 If, however, compensatory damages would not afford
adequate relief or it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the
amount of compensation which would afford adequate relief, injunctive relief may be deemed appropriate." In that case, the municipality can successfully enjoin the franchise from relocating and specifically enforce the remainder of the stadium lease term.
Obviously, the franchise will strongly argue that compensatory
damages at law provide adequate relief to the municipality and,
furthermore, that the amount of compensation is easily ascertainable. In support of this contention, several California cases have
held that prior history may be used to ascertain the amount of
percentage rent, if any, payable after default by a lessee. This
method has been defined by the California Supreme Court in
Lippman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.: o
For breach of an implied covenant to remain in business, the measure of damages ordinarily is the amount which the lessor would
have received from his share of the proceeds of the business had
the lessee operated it in its usual and customary manner."

Accordingly, the measure of damages for breach of the stadium
lease agreement is precisely computable as the average annual revenue for the years that have expired under the lease multiplied by
the number of years remaining in the lease.
Were stadium revenues-i.e., rent, parking, food and beverage
income-the only measure of damages suffered, the prior history
method of computation would appear both rational and convincing." However, the unique relationship existing between the municipality and a professional sports franchise cannot be overemphasized. For example, it has been estimated that within the last fifteen
years, one billion dollars has been expended for the construction of
municipally owned stadiums.33 As noted, the long-term public
27. Wehen v. Lundgaard, 41 Cal. App. 2d 610, 612, 107 P.2d 491, 493 (1940); Morrison v.
Land, 169 Cal. 580, 586, 147 P. 259, 265 (1915).
28. CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. §526 (West 1954).
29. See, e.g., Gainer v. Storck, 169 Cal. App. 2d 681, 388 P.2d 195 (1959); Lippman v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136, 280 P.2d 775 (1955); Grupe v. Glick, 26 Cal. 2d 680,
160 P.2d 832 (1945).
30. 44 Cal. 2d 136, 280 P.2d 775 (1955).
31. Id. at 146, 28 P.2d at 782.
32. This position was recently advocated by Charles 0. Finley, Inc. and Marvin Davis in
their combined effort to sell the Oakland A's baseball club for relocation in Denver, Colorado.
Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley, Charles 0. Finley, Inc., and
Marvin Davis, No. C77 2840 WHO (N.D. Cal. 1977).
33. FORBES, Feb. 15, 1975, at 26.
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bonding commitments surely contemplate the continued presence
of the professional team for whom the very stadium was built. Additional elements of damage, not susceptible of precise measurement,
include (1) loss to the citizenry of the opportunity to witness professional sport and (2) the loss of tax revenues occasioned by the decreased income of commercially related businesses within the municipality. The validity of these last two elements of damages will
be examined separately.

Loss of Opportunity to Witness
If a municipality can successfully argue that loss to the citizenry
of the opportunity to witness a particular major league sport constitutes damage recognizable in law, the use of the prior history
method of computing damages would be foreclosed as inadequate.
Because the extent of this loss, unique to the municipality/franchise
relationship, is unascertainable, it could not be adequately accounted for by any simple mathematical formula. Therefore, since
the proposed remedy at law would provide inadequate relief and
since the amount of compensation necessary to afford adequate relief is extremely difficult-if not impossible-to ascertain, an injunction should issue."
In rebuttal, the franchise can initially argue that the "loss" of
opportunity to witness major league athletic competition is so uncertain, speculative, and remote as not to warrant recognition in law
or equity. This contention arguably comports with the rationale of
Walpole v. Prefab Mfg. Co.," wherein the court on similar grounds
denied recognition of damages for injury to name, character, or
personal reputation. Additional support may be found in section
3301 of the California Civil Code, which states: "no damages may
be recovered for a breach of contract which are not clearly ascertainable in both their nature and origin."3 However, this statute has
been interpreted as giving the court great discretion in fixing estimated damages, especially where one's wrongful conduct has made
exact ascertainment of damages difficult.3 1 Moreover, "if the benefits claimed were reasonably certain to have been realized but for
the wrongful act of the opposing party, recovery should be al34. CAL. CODE CIV. PROc. § 526 (West 1954).
35. 103 Cal. App. 2d 472, 489; 230 P.2d 36, 48 (1951).
36. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3301 (West 1970).
37. Stephen v. Maloof, 274 Cal. App. 2d 843, 850, 79 Cal. Rptr. 461, 465 (1969).
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lowed."3 An application of these principles seriously, if not conclusively, undermines the franchise's first contention.
Secondly, the franchise may contend that the municipality,
within the meaning of section 367 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure,3 is not the real party in interest in regard to the claim
of loss of an opportunity to witness and thus may not urge it as a
basis for relief. Although this argument may make superficial good
sense, in that it is the citizens, not the city, who have suffered the
alleged loss, it is effectively parried by reference to section 369 of
the California Code of Civil Procedure, which is the express exception to section 367 of that Code: .
An executor or administrator, or trustee of an express trust, or a
person expressly authorized by statute, may sue without joining
with him the persons for whose benefit the action is prosecuted. A
person with whom, or in whose name, a contract is made for the
benefit of another, is a trustee of an express trust, within the meaning of this section.0

The stadium lease is undeniably a contract made for the benefit of
the citizens of the municipality, who benefit directly as spectators
and indirectly as commercial reapers of the added tourist harvest.
Furthermore, in a practical sense the very function of local government is to serve and represent the citizens by negotiating a lease
agreement most beneficial and advantageous to them. Hence, the
municipality should be considered a trustee of an express trust
within the meaning of section 369 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure and, as such, is the real party in interest in claiming
damages for the loss to the citizenry of the opportunity to witness a
particular major league sport.

Loss of Revenue to City Business
The foregoing considerations equally apply where the municipality seeks damages for the loss of revenue to consumer-oriented enterprises and the consequent decline in tax revenues. It is not illogical to assume that a professional sports franchise bearing the name
of a city brings both prestige and tourism to that city. As an obvious
example, a trade or business group searching for a convention site
will be substantially influenced in its decision by the amount and
38. Williams v. Krumsiek, 109 Cal. App. 2d 456, 459, 241 P.2d 40, 42 (1952).
39. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 367 (West 1973) now reads: "Every action must be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest, except as provided in section 369 of this code."
40. CAL. CODE CIv. Paoc. § 369 (West 1973) (emphasis added).
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kind of entertainment a particular city has to offer. Certainly, the
presence of a major league team improves the attractiveness of a
city and may well be the deciding factor in that locality's being
chosen over another. In this manner, a professional sports franchise
can be largely responsible for indirect business revenues generated
by tourism, as well as the more direct stadium income attributable
to the attending spectator."
Again, objections posed by the franchise on grounds that the
municipality lacks standing or that the damages claimed are unrecognizable in law and equity can be effectively countered by a reasoning process similar to that discussed in relation to the claim for
loss of opportunity to witness a professional sport. Yet, it must be
fairly noted that the issues of standing and damages as applied to
consumer-related businesses lean more strongly in favor of the franchise's position, since the municipality is less clearly a trustee and
the damages claimed would be more speculative. Nevertheless, if
there is no uncertainty as to the fact of damage, the same certainty
as to its amount is not required. 2
In sum, the municipality must show, in order to obtain injunctive
relief, that the legal remedy of compensatory damages will not provide adequate relief for the breach and that it is extremely difficult
to ascertain the amount of compensation that would constitute adequate relief.4 3 In order to accomplish this, the unique nature of the
municipality/franchise relationship must be stressed, including the
common funding and subsidization policies that essentially mandate full performance of the lease agreement. Atypical damage
claims such as loss of opportunity to witness and loss of indirectly
related business revenues should also be accredited. Once the validity of these losses is conceded, the inadequacy of a prior history
method for determining the extent of compensable harm becomes
readily apparent. Equally clear is the unascertainability of the
amount of compensation necessary to adequately relieve these
losses. Therefore, under the peculiar circumstances of a stadium
lease agreement, injunctive relief is warranted where the profes41. For example, on January 18, 1978, the roof of the Hartford Coliseum collapsed. The
Hartford Chamber of Commerce initially estimated that the loss of the use of the Coliseum
would cost city businesses 15-20 million dollars in related revenues annually. Wall St. J., Feb.
7, 1978, at 13, col. 1.
42. See Macken v. Martinez, 214 Cal. App. 2d 784, 29 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1963); Tomlinson v.
Wander Seed & Bulb Co., 177 Cal. App. 2d 462, 2 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1960).
43. CAL. CODE CIV. PROc. § 526 (West 1954).
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sional sports franchise threatens to relocate, and the court should
not hesitate to specifically enforce the contract.

PART III
STIPULATED
DAMAGES

REMEDIES AND

LIQUIDATED

Thus far, this note has examined California statutory and case
law relevant to the question of whether a municipality may successfully enjoin a professional sports franchise from breaching the terms
of the stadium lease. In this regard, it has been shown that the
"continuous acts" doctrine" presents a serious obstacle to the availability of injunctive relief. This can be overcome only if the municipality can persuasively emphasize the uniqueness of the stadium
lease relationship such that the proposed damages at law will not
afford adequate relief and an adequate amount of compensation is
not ascertainable.
Standing alone, these contentions of an aggrieved municipality,
although persuasive, may be insufficient to convince the court to
exercise its equitable jurisdiction. However, it is not uncommon for
a stadium lease to provide a formula for liquidated damages in the
event of breach by the lessee sports franchise, and this provision
may often operate in conjunction with a stipulated remedies provision expressly calling for injunctive relief in certain situations.
Thus, this section will examine the current legal effect such included provisions may have on the court's inclination to assume an
equity stance in favor of the municipality.

Liquidated Damages
Although it is beyond the scope of this note to discuss the enforceability of a liquidated damages provision," such a provision does
bear a strong relation to the municipality's argument that monetary
damages are not ascertainable. However, this does not mean to
suggest that such a provision is supportive of the city's position. To

the contrary, a liquidated damages clause in the stadium lease indicates that, despite the inability to precisely quantify the amount of
damage, the parties have agreed to a mutually satisfactory sum
certain in the event of breach by the sports franchise. Consequently,
44. See Part I, supra.
45. See generally 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRAcrs § 1058 (1964); Sweet, Liquidated
Damages in California, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 84 (1962).
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a claim by the municipality that no adequate remedy at law exists
for the loss of the franchise is directly refuted by the freely negotiated provision within the lease itself.
An alternative argument would contend that the liquidated damages provision, to which both parties had originally agreed, would
not be applicable, given a close examination of the changed circumstances surrounding the threatened departure of the franchise. For
example, this argument could include an assertion that the unanticipated success of the franchise has resulted in expanded revenues
not anticipated at the time of contracting and not bearing any reasonable relation to the amount of liquidated damages agreed upon.
As a consequence, the monetary formula prescribed would be presently insufficient to compensate the municipality.
Clearly, the best solution would be to avoid altogether the inclusion of a liquidated damages provision at the drafting stage of the
agreement. Otherwise, the municipality may be faced with an insurmountable obstacle to its claim that monetary damages will be
inadequate to wholly compensate for the loss of a sports franchise.

Stipulated Injunctive Relief
Traditionally, the essential test of equitable jurisdiction regarding agreements containing stipulated remedies provisions has not
been the nature of the contractual provision, but whether the complaint states a cause of action for equitable relief." Hence, a contractual clause providing that in the event of breach, specific performance or equitable relief will be granted has not, generally, been
given effect.
The modern trend of the law, however, is to favor the enforcement
of contracts and, if feasible, to adhere to the expressed intentions
of the parties." A provision in the stadium lease, freely negotiated
by the municipality and the franchise, which stipulates that a
breach will cause irreparable injury requiring equitable relief, confirms that the parties specifically contemplated the possibility of a
franchise transfer. If there is a reasonable basis for concluding that
damages would indeed be inadequate, the court should implement
the contractual intent of the parties. California statutorily recognizes that "an interpretation which gives effect is preferred to one
46. Reardon v. Melbourne, 53 Cal. App. 2d 257, 127 P.2d 618 (1942); Merrill v. Hare, 139
Cal. App. 462, 34 P.2d 194 (1934).
47. Addiego v. Hill, 238 Cal. App. 2d 842, 846, 48 Cal. Rptr. 240, 243 (1965).
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which makes void."" Therefore, a preferable judicial interpretation
of the stadium lease agreement would seem to favor injunction and
specific performance, especially where such a ruling is compatible
with the parties' manifest intention as expressed by the stipulated
remedies provision, and where the adequacy of damages is at least
doubtful."

As already noted, a peculiar characteristic of this lease is the
existence of a vested public interest. 0 Faced with a contract containing injunctive relief provisions, the court in West Edmond Hurton Lime Unit v. Stano Lind Oil and Gas Co."' stated:

The rights of parties are not governed by comparing the pecuniary
loss to one party and the benefit to another when, as here, the
rights of the parties are founded in contract and are sufficiently
explicit . . . if the rights and duties are fixed by contract, it is not

the question of convenience or inconvenience, or the comparative
amount of damage or injury resulting from the enforcement of the
right. It is the specific performance by the court of the bargain
which these parties have made, with their eyes open. This is especially true, we think, when the contract the partieshave made, and
which is sought to be enforced is affected with a public interest.52

That an equity court may be less reticent to enforce stipulated
injunctive remedies where the contract embraces a public interest
is further evidenced by the decision in Berkeley Lawn Bowling Club
5 In that case, the court specifically enforced an
v. City of Berkeley."
implied covenant in the lease requiring the city to maintain, even
if prohibitively expensive, the lawn bowling greens. Since continued
maintenance was deemed essential to the preservation of the sport
for the Berkeley citizens (i.e., in the public interest), the court ignored the cost and compelled performance.
The reasoning in the above decisions supports the contention that
in a stadium lease where stipulated remedies are provided and
where a vital public interest is conceded, injunctive relief is appropriate, particularly when the adequacy of a substitutive legal remedy is questionable at best.
§ 3541 (West 1970).
49. See generally 5 A.. COsBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRActs (1964) § 1142; D.
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIEs 825 (1973).
50. See Part I supra.
51. 193 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1951), cert. denied 343 U.S. 920 (1952).
52. Id. at 825 (emphasis added).
53. 42 Cal. App. 2d 280, 116 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1947).
48. CAL. CIV. CODE
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Thus, the inclusion in the stadium lease of a stipulated remedies
provision may well tip the balance in favor of the municipality's
claim for specific performance. The breaching franchise is left with
only two inarguably weak objections: (1) compensatory damages
represent, without doubt, a complete and adequate remedy at law;
and (2) the imposition of injunctive relief constitutes a clear abuse
of the court's discretion. Neither argument carries much merit, in
that the adequacy of damages at law has been shown to be at least
doubtful, if not wholly insufficient." Further, where both parties
have contractually agreed to equitable remedies in the event of
breach by the franchise, the enforcement of such relief is not nearly
equivalent to abuse. Instead, it properly allows the parties the benefit of their bargain.

PART IV
THE ECONOMIC REALITY ARGUMENT
This section represents a brief, but necessary, departure from the
strict application of relevant California statutes and case law that
has been the focus of this note thus far. The availability of injunctive relief to an aggrieved municipality for the franchise's threatened breach of the stadium lease may well be justifiable through
resort to legal principles alone. As already discussed, the asserted
inadequacy of the legal remedy of damages, the unascertainability
of the precise amount of adequate damages, and the public interest
involved all serve to effectively compromise the historic reluctance
of the court to provide equitable relief. Additional persuasive arguments, such as the unique relationship of the parties involved and
the common inclusion of stipulated remedies provisions in the stadium lease itself, have been mustered on behalf of the municipality's
claim for injunctive relief.
Nevertheless, a franchise has remaining a more practical objection to the imposition of injunctive relief, based upon the economic
realities of the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular
case. This argument centers on the very reason that, in all likelihood, inspires the contemplated breach-unprofitability. If injunctive relief, and of consequence, specific performance, is granted, the
franchise will contend that such an order essentially condones
bankruptcy, in that the team will be forced to abide a lease agreement that has proved economically infeasible. Although this con54. See Part II, supra.
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tention is primarily extra-legal in scope, California statutory and
case law arguably provides some initial backbone.
For example, it is a well-settled principle of equity that specific
performance of an agreement may not be ordered where a change
in intervening circumstances makes it unjust to grant such a remedy. This principle is codified in section 3391(2) of the California
Civil Code, which states: "[Sipecific performance cannot be enforced against a party to a contract . . . if it is not, as to him, just
and reasonable."'5 Moreover, numerous California court decisions
concerned with restrictive covenants in deeds of conveyance affirm
the impropriety of specific performance where substantial changes
in the neighborhood have rendered enforcement of the covenant
7 the
inequitable."6 In a leading case in this area, Wolff v. Fallon,"
California Supreme Court concluded that the landowner's lot was
not presently suitable for residential use and proceeded to find that
its use for commercial purposes would not detrimentally affect the
adjoining property or neighborhood, given the substantial change
from residential to business character that had occurred in the area
over a period of forty years. Therefore, enforcement of the restrictive
covenant limiting land use to residential purposes was denied as
inequitable and oppressive to the landowner.
Similarly, the franchise may analogize that substantial changes
in economic circumstances surrounding the stadium lease arrangement preclude the harsh remedy of specific performance. Though
each case may involve various indices of intervening hardship, such
as the imposition of a city ticket tax or the rise of vandalism and
assaults at the stadium, the most common and convincing complaint will stress the marked decline in home attendance, thereby
significantly reducing gate receipts and implying local disinterest.
As a result, the franchise logically reasons that specific performance
will not cure the enterprise's imminent financial collapse, nor will
it insure the continued presence of the team for the remainder of the
lease term. Hence, the imposition of equitable relief would work an
unjust hardship upon the franchise, especially where the citizenry,
for whose benefit the lease was originally obtained, appears unsupportive.
In order to effectively rebut these practical contentions, the mu55. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3391(2) (West 1970).
56. See 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRAcrs § 1163 (1964).
57. 44 Cal. 2d 695, 284 P.2d 802 (1955).
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nicipality must be equally creative. First, the unprofitability of the
professional sports franchise cannot be solely attributable to the
lack of fan support. Other factors, such as inefficient management,
inflated salaries, and failure to develop a competitive high-caliber
team, could easily account for the economic ills of the franchise and
the related attendance decrease. If specific performance is granted,
the franchise will realize, of necessity, the need for corrective action.
Once these business inefficiencies are eliminated, the franchise can
more profitably afford to build a championship team, the natural
consequence of which is expanded attendance.
In short, the asserted "substantial" change in the circumstances
affecting profitability may be more truly reflective of commercial
transgressions by the franchise itself. Consequently, neither the
Wolff analogy nor the statutory "just and reasonable" mandate is
applicable. The professional sports franchise, whose wrongful conduct has caused the harm, should not now be heard to complain if
the contractual bargain is enforced.

PART V
REPRESENTATIVE STADIUM LEASES AND ADVICE
This section of the note will survey and examine stadium leases
in force throughout the United States and involving different sports.
In noting the probable consequences attendant to the inclusion of
certain provisions within the particular type of lease, appropriate
advice to the draftsman is provided in the hope that future stadium
lease agreements will be designed so as to effectively protect the
municipality from franchise relocation. Within this context, the results of recent litigation will also be analyzed in view of the relevant
lease language at issue.
An in-depth study-" of representative stadium leases reveals that
there are essentially three categories into which these agreements
may be divided with regard to stipulated remedies provisions contained therein:
(1) Leases containing no mention of remedies or recourse in the
event of breach;
(2) Leases setting forth a liquidated damages formula to be applied in the event of breach by the franchise; and
58. The study included 17 leases between professional sports franchises and municipalities
selected randomly from throughout the United States. These leases represent eight cities and
cover five different sports.
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(3) Leases expressly providing for injunctive and equitable relief
in the event of breach thereof.

Leases Containing No Mention of Remedies or Recourse
in the Event of Breach
The majority of leases falls into this category," and the general
provisions therein include both affirmative and negative covenants.
The affirmative covenants usually involve promises by the franchise
to maintain major league membership in good standing, to compete
exclusively in the particular stadium covered by the lease, and to
use best efforts in fielding a successful team, thereby maximizing
attendance. The negative covenants include promises not to permit
the franchise to be transferred outside the municipality, not to sublet or mortgage the lease, and not to cause or allow any action that
will impair or diminish the value of the franchise.
As discussed in detail, 0 California statutes and case law provide
that an injunction cannot be granted to prevent the breach of a
contract whose performance would not be specifically enforced
under the "continuous acts" doctrine. Based upon this current status of the law, it would appear that leases containing no express
provisions for injunctive and equitable relief, and utilizing both
affirmative and negative covenants, seriously impair the municipality's ability to prohibit franchise relocation. Since the courts commonly decline to specifically enforce such leases, an injunction will
not likely be issued. It is advised, then, that the municipal draftsman include in the stadium lease an injunctive relief provision, with
the strongest language possible, in order to avoid the strong disinclination of equity to afford relief otherwise. Though it may be argued
that the court, in a proper case, should award injunctive relief as
readily as any compensatory legal remedy, there is a lack of compelling legal justification for such a position where the parties have not
indicated preference as to the remedies available.
In sum, those existing leases containing no provision for remedies
in the event of breach should be amended, where practical, and
future agreements should invariably contain forceful injunctive relief provisions in order to prevent wholesale franchise movement.
59. Nine of the 17 leases studied fall into this category.
60. See Part I, supra.
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Leases Setting Forth a Liquidated Damages Formula
Predictably, few stadium leases contain liquidated damages provisions, and those which do vary in the degree of detail announced
in the damages formula." It should be re-emphasized that a liquidated damages provision strongly inhibits the likelihood of a court's
approving injunctive and equitable relief to an aggrieved municipality. By definition, a liquidated damages provision implies that the
parties have agreed that a specific dollars and cents figure can adequately compensate the municipality for the loss of the team. Thus,
an argument on behalf of the municipality that monetary damages
will be inadequate compensation, thereby justifying injunctive relief, is directly contrary to the expressed intent of the lease agreement.
A second reason disfavoring the municipality's efforts to secure
injunctive relief is the fact that the more detailed provisions, in the
event of termination, generally propose a simple formula for computing damages, based upon the year in which the team breaches
the lease. For example, the liquidated damages provision in the
stadium lease between the City of Portland, Oregon, and the Portland Trailblazers begins by stating:
If the Club voluntarily and unilaterally relinquishes, sells, or
transfers its franchise in the National Basketball Association, or
in any successor professional basketball league or association, this
Agreement may be terminated by either party by giving the other
party thirty (30) days written notice of termination."
Clearly, this provision implies that the parties agree that termination, in and of itself, is not irreparably harmful, as long as a specified sum of money is paid in compensatory damages. With merely
thirty days' notice, the lease may be terminated by the franchise
and the municipality will be left with little or no equitable recourse.
For these reasons, it is strongly advised that the municipal draftsman avoid any inclusion of a liquidated damages provision within
the stadium lease agreement. Regardless of the legal validity of
liquidated damages provisions generally, their presence demonstrates the city's willingness to settle for monetary damages at law
as adequate compensation. Whether the court adheres to the particular damages formula expressed is immaterial, since in either event
61. Only two of the 17 leases studied fall into this category.
62. Agreement Between City of Portland and Pro Basketball, Inc., an Oregon Corporation
for the Use of the Memorial Coliseum Arena § 23 (May 28, 1975).
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injunctive relief has been denied, the lease terminates and the franchise is lost. Only by attempting to demonstrate significant changes
in the facts and circumstances surrounding the lease can the municipality hope to rationalize injunctive relief. To say the least, the
prospect of success in the face of a freely negotiated inapposite
provision is minimal.

Leases Expressly Providing for Injunctive and Equitable
Relief
An examination of stadium leases containing express provision for
injunctive relief in the event of franchise breach reveals significant
differences in the quality and strength of the language employed. 3
An excellent example of inadequate language is contained in the
stadium lease between the City and County of Denver, Colorado,
and the Denver Broncos: ". . . either party hereto shall have the

right to enjoin any substantial breach or threatened breach of this
agreement by the other."" Because the total length of the lease
equals twenty-eight pages, the legitimate question arises as to
whether this single sentence providing for injunctive relief represents a mere afterthought in drafting. There is no indication of why
injunctive relief should be invoked, nor is there any interpretation
of what constitutes "substantial breach." These omissions necessarily place the interpretive burden upon the court, which may deny
equitable relief if it believes that monetary damages can suffice.
In contrast to the foregoing provisions, several leases contain detailed and well-worded injunctive relief provisions, typically consisting of the following language:
Club covenants and agrees to exhibit professional
ball in the
-_
League and that its business efforts will be devoted to this
end. Club agrees that, because of the peculiar nature of its business
of professional
ball, a breach of any of the covenants contained
in this paragraph cannot be reasonably or adequately compensated
for in damages at law, and that a breach of said covenants will
cause municipality great and irreparable injury and damage. Club
agrees that, in addition to all other remedies whatsoever under this
agreement, municipality shall be entitled to injunctive and other
63. Six of the 17 leases studied fall into this category.
64. User Agreement by and Between the City and County of Denver, a Municipal Corporation of the State of Colorado, and Rocky Mountain Empire Sports, Inc., a Colorado Corporation, for the Use of Mile High Stadium § 19 (Jan. 1, 1977).
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equitable relief to prevent a breach of any of the covenants contained in this paragraph."

This unambiguous language virtually eliminates judicial inquiry by
underscoring the unique relationship between city and team, as well
as expressly stating that monetary damages at law will not compensate the city for the irreparable loss suffered. Furthermore, this
provision minimizes confusion that may arise from such words as
"substantial breach" by claiming entitlement to injunctive relief for
the breach of any covenant contained therein.
Although the above-quoted language vastly improves a municipality's prospect of receiving injunctive relief, it is advised that the
draftsman be even more specific. It will be prudent to contractually
set forth in some detail the rationale implicit in the assertion that
injunctive relief is indeed necessary. The lease should also confirm
that both parties recognize the immeasurable aesthetic appeal,
prestige, and commercial revenues that attend the presence of a
professional sports franchise in the locality. Expressing these notions within the four corners of the lease itself should overwhelmingly convince the court that injunctive relief constitutes both a
necessary and proper remedy. In essence, the ideally drafted stadium lease agreement will display a mini-brief of the very arguments
which have been discussed herein.
In conclusion, the particular language employed in a stadium
lease agreement may be controlling in determining the appropriate
remedy afforded an aggrieved municipality. Consequently, the best
precautionary measure that a municipal draftsman can follow is to
include a clear, strong, and unequivocal injunctive relief provision.
Although the current status of the law with regard to stipulated
remedies may be in flux, it preserves logic to contend that where the
parties have specifically mentioned injunctive relief as an agreed
remedy, the court should honor that provision.
65. See, e.g., Stadium Baseball License Agreement by and Between Oakland-Alameda
County Coliseum, Inc., a California Non-Profit Corporation, and Charles 0. Finley & Company, Inc., an Illinois Corporation for the Use of the Coliseum Site (Mar. 29, 1968); Agreement by and Between Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum, Inc., a California Non-Profit
Corporation, and E.W. McGah and F. Wayne Valley, General Partners of a Limited Partnership, Doing Business as the "Oakland Raiders," for the Use of the "Coliseum Site" (June 6,
1966); Indenture by and Between the City and County of San Francisco, a Municipal Corporation, and the San Francisco Forty Niners, a Limited Partnership, for the Use of Candlestick
Park Stadium (Dec. 3, 1969); Lease by and Between San Francisco Stadium, Inc. and National Exhibition Co. for the Use of Candlestick Park Stadium (Mar. 15, 1958).
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Recent Litigation Analyzed
In order to determine whether a municipality may successfully
preclude, through injunctive relief, a professional sports franchise
from departing, this note has heretofore argued that the preferred
legal remedy of damages is wholly inadequate. The inadequacy of
damages is especially apparent where, as here, public expectations
stand to be affected. As a final proposition, it has been recommended that the stadium lease itself contain a strong, explanatory
injunctive relief provision, such that the historic reluctance of courts
to command specific performance may effectively be defrayed. Nevertheless, these contentions are argued in a vacuum unless recent
judicial pronouncements in this novel area, though extremely
sparse, are analyzed. That analysis constitutes the purpose of this
section.
The only recent California case to reach the appellate level with
regard to the validity of injunctive relief provisions in stadium
leases is City of San Diego v. National League, et al." In 1973, the
management of the San Diego Padres baseball team announced its
intention to sell the franchise to Washington, D.C. interests planning on relocating the team to that city the following season. Justifications advanced by Padres management for such a decision included lack of adequate capital funds. The City of San Diego sued
in California Superior Court to enjoin the contemplated
sale/transfer until expiration of the stadium lease term (1988). In its
complaint," San Diego initially alleged that the Padres' announcement constituted a breach of several covenants contained within the
lease agreement." In addition, the city enumerated various grounds
justifying the imposition of injunctive relief, including irreparable
harm, loss of citizens' opportunity to witness major league baseball,
loss of business revenues to consumer-oriented establishments, and
loss of tax revenues."
After full briefing and a hearing, the Superior Court denied the
City of San Diego injunctive relief. It ruled:
... at this stage of the proceeding, it is apparent that the City
does have an action at law for damages and for a breach of their
66. City of San Diego v. National League, No. 343508 (Sup. Ct. for the County of San Diego
1973).
67. Complaint for Injunction, City of San Diego v. National League, No. 343508 (Sup. Ct.
for the County of San Diego 1973).
68. Id. at paras. 9-12.
69. Id. at para. 13.
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contractual relationship. And I am further of the opinion that that
matter of damages is measurable in terms of dollars, in terms of
money, and if that be so, then the court of equity must deny its
process by way of injunctive relief.
So as to the several theories proposed by the City, the Court can
only conclude at this time that it has an action on its contract for
damages; that the damages are measurable; that adequate relief
can be obtained in the courts of law; and that the pleading stage
in which I now find myself is such as to require a denial of the
injunctive relief sought by the City."
San Diego's application to the Fourth Appellate District for a writ
of supersedeas reversing the trial court's decision was also denied.
In pertinent part, the Appellate Court ruled:
An injunction cannot be granted to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced.
(Civ. Code §3423).
The lease between City and San Diego Padres contains a covenant on the part of the Padres that it will play and cause to be
played baseball games at the stadium for a period of 20 years; and
a covenant that Padres will not do anything which will cause the
franchise to be transferred to any other city or location. Thus it
contains both affirmative and negative covenants on the part of
the Padres.
Where a contract contains both affirmative and negative stipulations, equity will not interfere to prevent a breach of the negative
covenant when the affirmative covenant is of such a nature that it
cannot be specifically enforced by a judicial decree. (Long Beach
Drug Co. v. United Drug Co., 13 Cal. 2d 158, 168.)
Courts of Equity will not decree the specific performance of a
contract which by its terms stipulates for a succession of acts
whose performance cannot be consummated by one transaction,
but will be continuous and require protracted supervision and
direction. (Long Beach Drug Co. v. United Drug Co., supra, 13 Cal.
2d 158, 171; see also Thayer Plymouth Center, Inc. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 225 Cal. App. 2d 300.)
Consequently it was not shown to the trial court or to this Court
that the contract is capable of being specifically enforced and so
one whose breach may be enjoined. (Code Civ. Proc., §526.)"
70. Transcript of Hearing, at pp. 6-7, City of San Diego v. National League, No. 343508
(Sup. Ct. for the County of San Diego 1973).
71. Supersedeas Denied, City of San Diego v. National League (Calif. Court of Appeal,
Fourth App. Dist., Div. One 1973).
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Thus, the very statutes and cases cited in this note as unfavorable
to the municipality's position were deemed controlling in the denial
of injunctive relief.
In contrast to the above decision, there have been two subsequent
instances in which California trial courts have granted preliminary
injunctions to prevent a major league baseball team from breaching
its lease with a municipality. In 1976, the San Francisco Giants were
similarly sold to a brewery in Toronto, Canada, which planned to
transfer the team to that city. The Superior Court of the State of
California for the City and County of San Francisco granted a preliminary injunction to prevent the Giants from leaving San Francisco." Then, in 1977, the United States District Court of the Northern District of California granted a preliminary injunction to
Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum, Inc. to prevent the Oakland
Athletics from being sold and transferred to a Denver, Colorado,
purchaser.73
As a result of these decisions, it would seem apparent that the
current status of the law in this specific area is uncertain. All three
cases involved similar fact situations, and all operated under the
same California statutes and cases. However, there is present one
major factor distinguishing these contradictory decisions: the San
Diego stadium lease did not specifically provide for injunctive relief,
whereas both the San Francisco and Oakland leases contained explicit, strongly worded injunctive relief provisions." Since all three
72. Preliminary Injunction, City and County of San Francisco v. National Exhibition Co.,
No. 700-534 (Sup. Ct. for the City and County of San Francisco 1976).
73. Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley, Charles 0. Finley, Inc.,
and Marvin Davis, No. C77 2840 WHO (N.D. Cal. 1977).
74. The relevant portions of each lease are as follows:
San Diego Padres covenant to "Hold and maintain any and all rights and franchises
to play baseball in the City and County of San Diego in accordance with the
National League Rules, and will not do or suffer anything to be done which will
cause such right and franchise to be lost or impaired or diminished in any respect
or transferred to any other city or location." 6(C).
San FranciscoGiants agree that ". . . the services to be rendered by such baseball

players, which the Tenant covenants and agrees to employ, are of a special, unusual
and extraordinary character which gives them, and the Tenant as the Employer,
peculiar value in the world of professional baseball which cannot be reasonably or
adequately compensated for in damages at law and that the Tenant's breach of the
covenants contained in this paragraph 8 will cause the Landlord great and irreparable injury and damage. The Tenant agrees that in addition to all other remedies
under this Lease whatsoever, the Landlord shall be entitled to injunctive and other
equitable relief to prevent a breach of any of the covenants contained in this paragraph 8." 8(F).
Oakland Athletics agree that "because of the peculiar nature of its business of
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complaints contained practically identical language alleging the
need for injunctive relief, this distinction becomes noteworthy, if
not conclusive. If stipulated remedies are not included in the lease
itself, it seems obvious that the California courts will feel less constrained to estimate and allow money damages at law for the franchise's breach, despite indistinguishable circumstances. Therefore,
the municipal draftsman is clearly put on notice, by the results in
these decisions, that the inclusion of a detailed injunctive relief
provision in the stadium lease agreement is mandatory.
CONCLUSION
The glamour and attraction of professional athletics in the United
States has not waned. To the contrary, new leagues and teams,
involving every variety of sport imaginable, seem to evolve daily.
Naturally, the acquisition of successful sport franchises becomes the
subject of fierce competition among the cities, in that the presence
of such franchises adds immeasurable prestige, as well as revenue,
to the particular locale. As an unfortunate consequence, such competition also breeds infidelity. A franchise besieged with what it
views to be better offers, inevitably succumbs to temptation and
proceeds to depart its unhappy home, in violation of the stadium
lease agreement. Little omniscience is required to foresee the ensuing legal battle. An aggrieved municipality, saddled with a heavily
financed stadium and beset by an outraged citizenry, seeks to enjoin
the franchise from relocating until its lease obligation is satisfied.
On the other hand, the franchise admits the transgression and implores the court to allow a graceless departure upon the payment of
adequate damages.
It is hoped that this note has accomplished several purposes. First
and foremost, it is recommended that the courts become sensitized
to the foregoing scenario. Excessive franchise movement seems unavoidable, and judicial unpreparedness would be inexcusable. Secondly, the unabashed stance of the note has been in favor of the
aggrieved municipality. In this regard, the propriety and availabilprofessional baseball, a breach of any of the covenants contained in this paragraph
cannot be reasonably or adequately compensated for in damages at law, and that
a breach of said covenants will cause Coliseum, Inc. great and irreparable injury
and damage. Licensee agrees that, in addition to all other remedies under this
agreement whatsoever, Coliseum, Inc. shall be entitled to injunctive and other
equitable relief to prevent a breach of any of the covenants contained in this Paragraph 7." 1 7.
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ity of injunctive relief as a remedy for the threatened breach is
strongly suggested on the basis that the uniqueness of the city-team
relationship condemns the adequacy of damages. The final purpose
herein has been to educate counsel for the municipality to the need
for careful draftsmanship, given the recent judicial indications that
injunctive relief provisions must be contained within the lease itself.

